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Abstract 
 
We examine the relation between client tax aggressiveness and auditor‟s resignation decision. 
Consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance which suggests that client tax 
aggressiveness can increase litigation and reputational risk to auditors and increase the 
potential conflict with managers, we find a positive association between our proxies for tax 
aggressiveness and the likelihood that an auditor resigns from an audit engagement. Further, 
this association is stronger when external monitoring of the client firm is less effective, when 
there is greater potential for agency problems in the client firm, and when the economic 
importance of the fees received from the client firm is lower. Overall, our study identifies 
client tax risk as an important determinant of auditors‟ resignation. This result should be of 
interest to auditors who actively manage client audit risks and to tax authorities who have 
incentives to identify firms with abusive tax reporting behavior.   
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2277336 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate tax avoidance has generated much academic interest with researchers 
investigating its consequences. Some of these studies examine how equity investors/shareholders 
view tax avoidance with somewhat mixed results but generally consistent with investors viewing 
it as value increasing in better governed firms (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Hanlon and 
Slemrod 2009; Wilson 2009; Koester 2012; Goh et al. 2013). Others examine how debt markets 
and lenders view tax avoidance and find that private lenders view it positively (Lisowksy et al. 
2012a; Kim et al. 2010) while public lenders via bond issues view it negatively (Shevlin et al. 
2012). In this paper, we extend the consequences literature to examine how auditors view tax 
aggressive behavior in client firms. Specifically we examine whether client tax aggressiveness is 
related to an auditor‟s decision to resign from an audit engagement. Auditor resignation is an 
important corporate event dealing with the fundamental relationships between an auditor and 
management and an auditor and shareholders. The event is economically important because 
investors react most negatively when these relationships are terminated by auditors while there is 
no reliable market reaction when the relationships are terminated by clients (Griffin and Lont 
2010). Furthermore, because these relationships are linked to questions on auditor independence 
and auditor‟s legal responsibilities to shareholders, our study provides insights into how auditors‟ 
perceived independence and legal liability are affected by client tax aggressiveness. 
 Prior studies show that a principal reason for auditors to resign is the desire to limit 
exposure to litigation risk stemming from the auditor‟s private information on client 
misrepresentations or errors (e.g., Stice 1991; Johnstone and Bedard 2004). We expect auditors 
to face higher litigation risks with regards to their clients‟ risky tax behavior because 
shareholders might attempt to hold auditors responsible for tax-related deficiencies in the 
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financial statements (Donohoe and Knechel 2013).1 In the event that the firm is sued for abusive 
tax sheltering activity, the auditor could be accused of failure to ensure disclosure of adequate 
tax reserves. In addition, if tax abusive transactions are challenged by the IRS on audit, a 
substantial tax claim and related interest and penalties can lead the client to financial problems 
and restatements of financial reports, both of which are closely related to auditors‟ litigation risk 
and reputational penalty (Stice 1991; Hennes et al. 2011).  
The agency view of tax aggressiveness lends further support to the link between tax 
aggressiveness and auditor resignation. Under this view, managers have incentives to conceal 
their opportunistic behavior from the investigations of auditors and investors by maintaining the 
complexity and opacity of tax avoidance activities (Kim et al. 2011). This increased opacity 
makes it harder for auditors to uncover any accounting irregularities embedded within tax 
avoidance activities. Moreover, the agency problems embedded within tax avoidance activities 
can cause a serious breakdown in auditor-client relationship, making it harder for auditors to 
peacefully remediate the problems without conflicts with managers. Finally, tax aggressiveness 
behavior calls into question the integrity and risk profile of management (Deasi and Dharmapala 
2006; Hanlon et al. 2012, footnote 11), casting doubts about the quality of other compliance 
activities and the overall control environment. To the extent that aggressive tax behavior is 
interpreted as weak “tone at the top” or doubtful management integrity, auditors will lose 
confidence in management representations and perceive a higher litigation and reputational risk.  
While the above discussion suggests that tax aggressiveness is related to an auditor‟s 
higher litigation and reputational risk, agency problems and doubts about management integrity, 
                                                          
1According to Bryan-Low (2004), after facing costly tax audits and SEC scrutiny over aggressive tax positions, 
several companies filed lawsuits against their auditors claiming they failed to identify material reporting issues. In 
other cases, clients claimed the auditors committed fraud and misrepresentation when marketing aggressive tax 
strategies. 
4 
 
tax aggressiveness might not be associated with auditor resignation for the following two reasons. 
First, resignation is a costly act for auditors because they have to give up the fees which could 
have been earned from the current appointment and those which would probably be payable in 
future periods (DeAngelo 1981). Hence, it is possible for auditors to continue to serve a tax 
aggressive client as long as they view the risk as not material enough to trigger a resignation or 
they are able to offset the risk through exerting more effort and charging higher fees.2 Second, 
when the external audit firm provides tax services, its tax professionals become client advocates 
that develop favorable tax positions. This conflict can create a disincentive for the auditor to take 
a conservative view of tax risk or to challenge managers of tax aggressive clients over tax 
issues.3 Thus, if the client tax advocacy role prevails over the auditor‟s desire to limit exposure to 
litigation risk, we expect no relation between client tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation.   
  To empirically test the association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation, 
we construct two main measures of client tax aggressiveness: (1) the estimated probability of 
engaging in tax shelters (Shelter) based on Wilson‟s (2009) tax sheltering prediction model and 
(2) discretionary permanent book-tax differences (DTAX) based on the prediction model of 
nondiscretionary permanent differences in Frank et al. (2009). Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) 
recommend that researchers carefully consider the appropriateness of tax avoidance measures for 
the research question at hand. They also state, “If tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax 
planning strategies where something like municipal bond investments are at one end (lower 
explicit tax, perfectly legal), then terms such as “noncompliance,” “evasion,” “aggressiveness,” 
and “sheltering” would be closer to the other end of the continuum.” Given that our study is 
                                                          
2 Consistent with this view, Donohoe and Knechel (2013) find that audit fees are associated with low long-run 
effective tax rates, their proxy for tax avoidance, implying that audit fees are increasing in tax avoidance. 
3 For example, McGuire et al. (2012) find that external auditors providing both audit and tax services who are either 
industry tax or overall specialists are associated with a higher level of client tax avoidance, which implies that joint 
service providers significantly assist their clients in avoiding taxes. 
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motivated by an agency perspective of tax avoidance and is aimed at exploring the consequence 
of aggressive and opaque management tax behavior, we choose two measures that capture the 
more extreme form of tax avoidance activities.  
Using a sample of client firms that change auditors over the period 2000-2010, we find a 
positive association between our proxies for tax aggressiveness and the likelihood that an auditor 
resigns from an audit engagement. This result suggests that client tax aggressiveness raises the 
concerns of auditors over litigation and reputational losses and a potential conflict with managers 
and that these concerns on average outweigh the opportunity cost of resignation such as foregone 
fees. To further explore whether the agency problems arising from tax aggressiveness contribute 
to auditor resignations, we test whether the extent of external monitoring (proxied by 
institutional ownership and analyst following) and potential for agency problems in the client 
firm (proxied by free cash flow and managerial ownership) moderate the relation between tax 
aggressiveness and resignation decision. We find that the likelihood of auditor resignation from a 
tax aggressive client is greater when external monitoring of the client is likely less effective and 
when there is greater potential for agency problems in the client. These results are consistent 
with the complementarities between tax avoidance activities and rent diversion such that when 
external monitoring is weak or the potential for agency problems in the client firm is high, it is 
harder for the auditor to disentangle, understand, and resolve tax-related accounting irregularities 
arising from opportunistic managerial behavior without conflicts with managers. The auditor‟s 
difficulty in resolving the potential problems further heighten the litigation and reputational risks 
and trigger a resignation. Finally, we find that the association between auditor resignation and 
tax aggressiveness is weaker when the client fee importance or the ratio of tax fees to total fees is 
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higher. These results suggest that the economic importance of the client and the provision of 
non-audit tax service lower auditors‟ incentives to resign from tax aggressive clients.   
We conduct several additional analyses to test the robustness of our results. First, we 
examine how the results vary with alternative measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the 
positive relationship between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation continues to be 
significant when we use the unrecognized tax benefit disclosed by the firm pursuant to FIN 48 as 
an alternative more aggressive tax avoidance measure. When we use measures that capture less 
extreme forms of tax avoidance such as permanent book-tax difference, total book-tax difference 
and cash effective tax rate, the results are either weakly significant or insignificant, thus 
supporting our choice of more aggressive tax avoidance measures. Second, we control for 
alternative metrics of financial reporting risk such as predicted restatement score (Dechow et al. 
2011), total accruals (Hanlon et al. 2012), and accruals quality (Francis et al. 2005) in our 
resignation model and find that our main results are not sensitive to these alternative metrics. 
Further analyses reveal that our main results are not driven by a subsample of client firms with 
high financial reporting riskiness (where subsamples are formed by partitioning the sample based 
on the median of the financial reporting risk variables). Third, we repeat our auditor resignation 
test without restricting the sample to firms that switch auditors. Our inferences remain 
qualitatively the same.4 Fourth, we examine how the association between tax aggressiveness and 
auditor resignation differs between the pre- and post-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
period and find that the association is stronger in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX 
period. Fifth, when we further control for abnormal audit fees in our regressions, the effect of tax 
                                                          
4 In the main sample, we only include client firms that switch auditors because Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) argue 
that firms that switch auditors are different in many perspectives from the population of firms that do not switch 
auditors. They suggest that a finding from the comparison of resignation cases and non-switching cases is not 
necessarily interpretable as active risk management by the auditor because all auditor switching cases, whether they 
are dismissals or resignations, are partially explained by high risk. 
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aggressiveness on auditor resignation still remains significant. This result suggests that charging 
higher audit fees does not totally eliminate the auditor risk associated with client tax 
aggressiveness, leading to auditor resignation. Finally, we repeat our analysis after restricting the 
sample to Big N auditor clients and obtain similar results.   
Our study makes important contributions to the literature. First, while there have been a 
number of studies investigating how debt and equity market participants perceive a firm‟s tax 
aggressiveness (e.g., Crabtree and Maher 2009; Kim et al. 2010; Ayers et al. 2010; Lisowsky et 
al. 2012a; Shevlin et al. 2012; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Koester 2012), not much is known 
about how a firm‟s tax aggressiveness affects the external auditor‟s behavior. Donohoe and 
Knechel (2013) show that audit fees are positively associated with lower long-run effective tax 
rates, their proxy for tax avoidance. Hanlon et al. (2012) show that audit fees are positively 
associated with book-tax differences but in sensitivity analysis conclude that this relation is 
driven by book-tax differences proxying for earnings management rather than tax avoidance. Our 
study differs from these two studies in that we focus on how the auditor resignation decision is 
affected by the agency problems and conflicts with management exacerbated by tax 
aggressiveness. Further, we find that our main results are robust when we explicitly control for 
various proxies for earnings management and that the severity of earnings management has no 
incremental effect on the association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation. These 
results suggest that earnings management associated with tax aggressiveness is not the 
dominating force that drives the breakdown of the auditor-client relationship. Rather, our finding 
that the association between auditor resignation and tax aggressiveness is more pronounced for 
firms with greater potential for agency problems implies that despite auditors‟ role to mitigate 
agency problems, they are often constrained in their ability to remediate the problems because of 
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managers‟ conflicting incentives, and thus resign from the audit engagement. This finding is 
consistent with the agency perspective of tax aggressiveness and provides new insights into both 
the sophistication and limitations of auditors in mitigating agency problems related to tax 
aggressiveness. 
Second, this study contributes to the literature on auditor resignation. While the literature 
suggests that auditors‟ litigation risk is the most salient reason why auditors resign (e.g., 
Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Shu 2000; Stice 1991), no studies have explicitly examined clients‟ 
tax risk as an important determinant of auditor resignation. Whilst prior studies focus on other 
client risk factors such as financial distress, substandard reporting, and stock return volatility, 
this study provides new evidence regarding the effect of tax aggressiveness on auditor 
resignation. In this regard, our results will be of interest to auditors who actively manage client 
audit risks and to tax authorities who have incentives to identify firms with abusive tax reporting 
behavior.   
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research methodology. Section 4 and 5 
present and discuss the results and sensitivity checks, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Prior literature on auditor resignation 
  Auditor resignations are auditor-client relation terminations that are initiated by the 
auditor rather than the client. All auditor resignations involve some costs. The client firm will 
have to search for a suitable replacement and bear a share of the incoming auditor‟s setting up 
costs. The uncertainty created by the resignation can also signal negative messages to the market 
and adversely affect the share price of the firm (Shu 2000; Wells and Loudder 1997). The 
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resigning auditor will lose the fees which could have been earned from the current appointment 
and those which would probably be payable in future periods (DeAngelo 1981). Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that neither party would initiate a resignation without some serious reasons. 
For example, auditors might resign because of a severe breakdown in the relationship with 
management, such as a serious conflict with management and lack of confidence in the 
management‟s integrity (Dunn and Sikka 1999). Resignation could be motivated by professional 
considerations, such as the discovery of an impediment to independence and the auditor‟s doubts 
about their ability to provide a satisfactory quality of audit.  
Prior research provides evidence that various audit and litigation risk factors affect the 
auditor resignation decision. Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) report evidence that the likelihood of 
litigation is positively associated with the probability that the auditor will resign rather than be 
dismissed from the engagement. Johnstone and Bedard (2004) find evidence that audit firms 
shed riskier clients in their client portfolio, and that audit risk factors related to client controls, 
financial reporting quality, and management integrity are more important in client portfolio 
decisions than are financial risk factors. Finally, Bockus and Gigler (1998) present a theoretical 
model which shows that increased auditor liability leads to more auditor resignation and lower-
quality audits.  
In addition to the litigation concerns, Shu (2000) shows that auditor resignations can be 
due to clientele adjustments by auditors. She demonstrates that the resignations from clientele 
adjustments are likely driven by changes in auditor supply-side characteristics such as auditor‟s 
production cost and opportunity cost considerations.5 Ettredge et al. (2011) find that the strength 
                                                          
5 Following Shu (2000), we control for the effect of this client misalignment (Mismatch). We determine an optimal 
cut-off probability that predicts whether a client is better matched with a Big N or a non-Big N auditor. If the actual 
auditor is a Big N (non-Big N) auditor when the predicted auditor is a non-Big N (Big N) auditor (that is, the actual 
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of clients‟ internal control is also related to auditor turnover (dismissals and resignations). They 
show that firms receiving adverse SOX 404 opinions are more likely to experience auditor 
turnover. Lastly, studies document that auditor resignations cause an adverse stock market 
reaction and potential mistrust by investors over the firm‟s financial reporting quality (Griffin 
and Lont 2010; Whisenant et al. 2003; Shu 2000; Wells and Loudder 1997). 
 In sum, extant research suggests that concern about client risk in making client retention 
decisions is mainly due to the potential consequences of undiscovered reporting problems in 
terms of litigation costs and reputational losses. Litigation against auditors is often premised on 
the allegation of an audit failure (Stice 1991). Palmrose (1987) shows that about 46 percent of 
auditor litigation cases involved instances where financial reporting irregularities, predominantly 
management fraud, took place. Cases involving these types of irregularities were also much more 
likely to result in auditors making costly litigation settlement payments. Thus, tax aggressiveness 
could affect an auditor‟s client retention decision if the auditor‟s perception of audit and 
litigation risk changes with the level of the client‟s tax aggressiveness or if the client firm‟s tax 
aggressiveness casts some doubts about the management‟s integrity and representations.  
2.2. Tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation 
 The primary role of auditors is to express an opinion as to whether the financial 
statements and related disclosures present fairly, in all material respects, the client firm‟s 
financial condition in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Because income 
taxes can amount up to nearly one-half of a public firm‟s net income, an auditor should always 
consider the amount as material to financial statements. Hence, auditors evaluate the validity of 
accrued taxes payable and tax contingent liabilities on the balance sheet, income tax expense on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
auditor of the client is opposite to the prediction in the prior year), then we consider the client to be mismatched with 
its current auditor. 
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the income statement, and the related note disclosures to provide adequate assurance to the 
investing public about the appropriateness of these items and disclosure (Barrett 2004). Because 
any material information about risky tax transactions tends to be hidden in these accounts and 
disclosure, auditors also have to assess whether their clients engage in potentially abusive tax 
transactions that can be challenged if uncovered by the IRS. 
Firms that engage in tax aggressiveness have a higher chance of misstatements and 
restatements because managers can use various accounts such as valuation allowances, tax 
contingency reserves, and estimates of accrued taxes to manipulate earnings (e.g., Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010; Frank and Rego 2006; Gupta et al 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2004). Because a 
client‟s aggressive financial reporting is positively associated with auditor litigation risk 
(Heninger 2001; Palmrose and Scholz 2004), tax aggressiveness can increase the litigation risk 
of the auditor. Furthermore, aggressive tax positions involve complex and risky techniques, 
which require additional research, specialized audit procedures, documentation, and 
consultations with tax professionals to audit (Donohoe and Knechel 2013). Even when auditors 
expend additional effort, auditing sophisticated transactions with questionable legal grounds has 
a high risk of error that can expose them to potential litigation, regulatory, and reputational costs.  
Auditors could face even higher litigation risks in the post-SOX era because of the 
increase in litigation suits against tax shelter firms and promoters, including auditors (IRS 2005). 
Due to the heightened reporting regulations on the aggressive forms of corporate tax avoidance, 
shareholders can hold auditors responsible for tax-related deficiencies in the financial 
statements. 6  For instance, while auditors assess uncertain tax benefits under Financial 
                                                          
6 We obtain the following examples of lawsuits filed against the auditors for tax-related deficiencies from Donohoe 
and Knechel (2013). In Overton v. Trodman (478 F. 3d. 479), investors of Direct Brokerage Inc sued the firm‟s 
auditor, Todman & Co, for its failure to ensure that its tax liabilities have been properly stated. Navistar 
International Corporation also filed a lawsuit against its auditor alleging that erroneous tax accruals contributed to 
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Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) (Hanlon et al. 2012),7 several studies argue that the tax reserve 
disclosed pursuant to FIN 48 is a reliable indicator of a firm‟s tax sheltering activity (e.g., 
Frischmann et al. 2008; Song and Tucker 2008). In the event that the firm is sued for abusive tax 
sheltering activity, the auditor could be accused of failure to ensure disclosure of adequate tax 
reserves. 
 Auditor litigation risk can be further heightened in the event that tax transactions are 
discovered or alleged by the IRS on audit to be abusive. The client will likely spend considerable 
sums for legal and accounting assistance in defending its tax strategies. At some point, a decision 
will have to be made to settle or contest the tax liability. Settlement likely entails a substantial 
tax claim and related interest or penalties, which often lead the client firm to financial problems 
such as illiquidity and debt servicing inability (Beale 2004). As such, investors who suffer losses 
from client financial distress may attempt to recover their losses through lawsuits against the 
auditors (Kinney and McDaniel 1989; Stice 1991). Moreover, recent studies have shown that 
news about a firm‟s involvement in tax shelters reduces stock price (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009) 
and a firm‟s stock price crash risk increases with tax aggressiveness (Kim et al. 2011). The 
potential loss in shareholders‟ wealth can also precipitate lawsuits against the firm and its auditor 
(e.g., Francis et al. 1994; Grundfest and Perino 1997).  
The agency problems embedded within corporate tax avoidance can further heighten the 
litigation risks facing the auditor, leading to her resignation. In particular, Slemrod 
(2004) stresses the differences between individual and corporate tax compliance, arguing that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
costly debt refinancing and stock delisting (Stempel 2011). In Endo v. Albertine (863 F. Supp. 708), shareholders of 
Fruit of the Loom filed a lawsuit against auditor Arthur Andersen alleging they were misled by misrepresentations 
of future tax obligations and prior tax deficiencies. Finally, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) also faulted BDO for audit deficiencies involving clients‟ provisions for income tax (Aubin 2012). 
7 The auditor must also assess contingent tax liabilities under the SFAS 5 regime and potential permanent losses of 
tax benefits due to IRS restrictions on certain leasing activities (e.g., SILO, LILO) under SFAS No. 13.  
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latter should be analyzed in a principal-agent framework. He develops a theoretical framework 
that embeds aggressive tax decisions within a managerial agency context and emphasizes the 
importance of interactions between rent diversion and tax avoidance. Consistent with the agency 
view, several studies suggest that complex tax avoidance transactions provide management with 
the tools, masks, and justifications for opportunistic managerial behavior, such as earnings 
manipulations, related party transactions, and other resource-diverting activities (e.g., Chen et al. 
2010; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Kim et al. 2011). For example, complex tax shelters created 
by Enron allowed managers to manipulate earnings while preventing investors from 
understanding the sources (Desai and Dharmapala 2009). The tax avoidance activities arranged 
by Tyco facilitated the centralization of power by management and enabled them to obscure their 
rent diversion through means such as unauthorized compensation, abuse of corporate funds for 
personal uses, and insider trading (Desai 2005). In line with this view, studies document that 
aggressive tax reporting leads to lower earnings quality, a higher likelihood of managerial fraud, 
and higher stock price crash risk (e.g., Badertscher et al. 2009; Ettredge et al. 2008; Frank et al. 
2009; Hanlon 2005; Kim et al. 2011).  
Under this view in which a hidden intention of tax aggressiveness is to pursue managerial 
opportunism and rent diversion, managers have incentives to conceal their opportunistic behavior 
from auditors and investors by maintaining the complexity and opacity of tax avoidance 
activities (Kim et al. 2011). This behavior makes it more difficult for auditors to uncover any 
accounting irregularities embedded within tax avoidance activities. Further, the agency problems 
caused by tax avoidance activities can cause a serious breakdown in the relationship between the 
auditor and management, making it harder for auditors to peacefully remediate the problems 
14 
 
without conflicts with managers.8 The inability to resolve potential conflicts and accounting 
irregularities can further increase the likelihood of accounting misstatements and heighten the 
litigation and reputational risks of the auditors.  
Finally, tax aggressiveness behavior calls into question the integrity and risk 
profile/appetite of management.9 Ethridge et al. (2007) survey 60 audit partners and find that 
management integrity is ranked as the most important factor in determining audit engagement 
risk among 10 components of client business risk, audit risk, and auditor‟s business risk,. 
Jonstone and Bedard (2004) also argue that audit risk factors such as client controls and 
management integrity provide more useful measures of litigation risk than financial risk factors 
in auditor‟s client retention decision.10 The auditor might infer from aggressive tax behavior that 
management integrity is weak and they are excessively risk-taking in financial reporting as well. 
Such managers are more likely to circumvent internal controls to achieve fraudulent reporting 
objectives and are also more likely to unduly influence the audit, make inaccurate representations 
to the auditors, and interfere with the auditor‟s discussion with the board of directors or the audit 
committee. Moreover, tax aggressiveness could indicate management‟s attitude towards 
compliance with rules and regulations (Hanlon et al. 2012, footnote 11). A weak tone at the top 
                                                          
8 An alternative traditional view in the literature, however, argues that managers undertake tax aggressiveness 
activities for the sole purpose of reducing corporate tax obligations, which result in greater wealth for the firm and 
its shareholders (e.g., Swenson 1999; Graham and Tucker 2006). Under this view, managers are likely to be 
cooperative in resolving the problems because no agency problems are involved. 
9 Studies have shown that aggressive tax behavior is driven by “tone at the top” (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2010; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006). Further, Rego and Wilson (2012) argue that tax avoidance is a risky activity, which imposes 
costs on both firms and managers and thus, managers must be incentivized to engage in tax avoidance that involves 
uncertain outcomes. They find that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake more aggressive (i.e., 
risky) tax positions.  
10 The authors measure management integrity based on the number of risk factors present from a set of nine 
questions with dichotomous responses dealing with a possible lack of management integrity, including those related 
to management‟s autocratic tendencies, questionable resignations of management, contentious termination of a 
relationship with a financial advisor, a history of suing financial advisors, a history of litigation against the entity, a 
history of management attempts to unduly influence the audit, a history of management attempts to unduly influence 
the auditor‟s discussions with the board of directors or the audit committee, a history of inaccurate management 
representations, and integrity problems for individuals associated with the entity‟s financial reporting. 
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and its effect on overall control environment can increase the likelihood that the auditor might 
not be able to uncover financial misstatements. Therefore, to the extent that aggressive tax 
behavior is interpreted as weak tone at the top or doubtful management integrity, auditors will 
lose confidence in management representations and perceive a higher litigation and reputational 
risk. 
 In sum, the above discussion suggests that tax aggressiveness is related to an auditor‟s 
higher litigation and reputational risks, severe agency problems, and the doubts about 
management representation and integrity, all of which are potential drivers of auditor resignation. 
Hence, we formulate our hypothesis in alternative form as follows: 
H1: Tax aggressiveness is positively associated with auditor resignation.  
Although we expect tax aggressiveness to be positively associated with auditor 
resignation, we recognize that there are at least two arguments that are consistent with a null 
hypothesis. First, auditors could view tax aggressiveness a risk that is not “material enough” to 
trigger a resignation. Given that an audit firm that resigns will forego the value of future audit 
fees and possibly fees from other services provided to the client, the auditor is likely to sacrifice 
these revenues only when the risk arising from tax aggressiveness is serious enough and cannot 
be substantially reduced with additional audit efforts. To the extent that auditors are able to offset 
the risk through exerting more audit effort and charging higher audit fees, there will not be a 
significant association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation.11  
Second, prior studies suggest that auditors play a role as an advocate of their client‟s 
aggressive tax avoidance strategies. Evidence indicates that when the external auditor provided 
                                                          
11 Using a compound measure of two long-run effective tax rates, Donohoe and Knechel (2013) find evidence of an 
audit fee premium attributable to tax aggressiveness that is incremental to premiums relating to an auditor‟s general 
concerns about earnings management via the tax accounts. In addition, they find that auditor-provided tax services 
are associated with knowledge spillovers that offset the fee premium for tax aggressiveness, unless tax uncertainty is 
high. 
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tax services to an audit client in the pre-SOX period, the client exhibited a higher level of tax 
avoidance (AICPA 2000; Bobek et al. 2010), suggesting that the auditors were client advocates 
who work to develop tax avoidance strategies. Although the use of auditor-provided tax services 
substantially declined after the passage of SOX, McGuire et al. (2012) continue to find that the 
tax-specific industry expertise and overall industry expertise (i.e., combined tax and audit 
expertise) of an external auditor is associated with a higher level of tax avoidance in the post-
SOX period, 12 suggesting that auditors employ their tax and general industry knowledge to help 
their clients devise a higher level of tax avoidance strategies rather than using their expertise to 
constrain the tax avoidance activities. Moreover, Cook and Omer (2012) find that approximately 
two-thirds of the public firms in their sample continue to purchase at least a portion of their tax 
consulting and compliance services from their external auditor in the post-SOX period, which 
implies that the external audit firm can still simultaneously affect many of its clients‟ tax 
avoidance activities. Thus, to the extent that clients value auditor assistance that extends beyond 
basic audit-related services, it is possible that despite the risk associated with tax aggressiveness, 
auditors can continue to serve their clients and aid them in developing favorable tax positions in 
pursuing high fees.  
2.3 Cross-sectional difference in the effect of tax aggressiveness on auditor resignation 
To the extent that an auditor is more likely to resign from a tax aggressive client (H1), we 
expect this likelihood to further vary with client- and engagement-specific characteristics. We 
first predict that the likelihood will differ with the strength of external monitoring. As 
highlighted earlier, one of the arguments for the association between tax aggressiveness and 
auditor resignation is based on the agency tension between managers and shareholders, which 
                                                          
12 Their main analysis excludes clients that do not purchase tax services from their auditor, but they show that the 
results are consistent when they use a sample that includes those firms (see Table 8 of McGuire et al. 2012).  
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gives rise to opportunistic managerial behavior and rent diversion. Hence, strong external 
monitoring mechanisms can moderate the complementarities between tax aggressiveness and 
both managerial opportunism and rent diversion, alleviating the effect of tax aggressiveness on 
auditors‟ resignation decisions. Prior studies suggest that effective external monitoring attenuates 
adverse consequences of tax aggressiveness and managerial opportunism. Kim et al. (2011) find 
that the positive relation between tax avoidance and stock price crash risk is diminished for firms 
with strong external monitoring mechanisms such as high institutional ownership and analyst 
coverage. 13  Based on the discussion above, we expect that the association between tax 
aggressiveness and auditor resignation, if any, will be diminished for firms with strong external 
monitoring mechanisms. This argument leads to the following hypothesis in alternative form:   
H2a: The association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignations is weaker when 
external monitoring in the client firm is effective, all else being equal. 
Next, we examine how the association between tax aggressiveness and auditor 
resignation varies with the potential for agency problems in client firms.  As discussed earlier, 
managerial opportunism and rent diversion associated with tax avoidance activities will be 
important concerns in auditors‟ client retention decisions. The concerns will be aggravated when 
their clients are subject to greater potential for agency problems. In particular, we consider free 
cash flows and managerial ownership to gauge the potentials for agency problems. We argue that 
free cash flows is a proxy for the extent of potential damages caused by the agency problems 
because when there is little free cash flow, managers have fewer incentives and resources to 
squander. Studies suggest that managers with access to free cash flows have incentives to 
                                                          
13 We acknowledge that an alternative channel of monitoring is internal monitoring by audit committee measured by 
attributes such as independence, size, and financial expertise. However, the lack of readily available data for our 
sample restricts us from examining this channel. While such data are available in machine readable form for S&P 
1500 firms, a majority of our sample firms are not covered. 
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overinvest in projects that satisfy their personal preferences rather than benefit shareholders (e.g., 
Jensen 1986; Richardson 2006), and that a reduction in the free cash flow available to 
opportunistic managers through the payment of cash dividends reduces agency costs (Chen et al. 
2011; Christie and Nanda 1994). Managerial stock ownership has been viewed as a channel of 
aligning managerial interests with shareholders‟, thus reducing firms‟ agency conflicts (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). Consistent with this view, Warfield et al. (1995) find a negative association 
between managerial ownership and opportunistic behavior relating to earnings management. If 
higher managerial ownership aligns managers‟ interests with shareholders‟, we expect managers 
to be less likely to use tax aggressive activities for opportunism.14  In sum, to add more credence 
to the agency theory explanation for the possible association between tax aggressiveness and 
auditor resignations, we test the following hypothesis in alternative form:  
H2b: The association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation is weaker when the 
potential for agency problems in the client firm is low, all else being equal. 
Finally, we explore how auditors‟ possible fee dependence affects the relation between 
tax aggressiveness and resignation decisions. Existing research suggests that auditors act 
independently due to reputation and litigation costs (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1983; Palmrose 
1988). However, an auditor‟s independence can be possibly harmed when its client is 
economically important to the auditor because the existence of client-specific quasi-rent creates 
an incentive for the auditor to compromise independence (DeAngelo 1981) and can cause the 
auditor to become more financially dependent on the client (DeFond and Francis 2005; Kinney 
                                                          
14 On the other hand, Morck et al. (1988) argue that greater ownership would provide managers with deeper 
entrenchment and, therefore, greater scope for opportunistic behavior. In this case, there could be more opportunistic 
behavior by management of tax aggressive firms.  
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and Libby 2002).15 When the economic importance of fees received from the client is high, the 
auditor could be more tolerant towards the client‟s tax aggressive behavior and less likely to 
resign. To empirically test this prediction, we measure the economic importance of fees by client 
fees relative to total fees earned by auditor at the office level (e.g., Chung and Kallapur 2003; Li 
2009). In addition, we use the proportion of client tax fees to client total fees as an alternative 
proxy because a large number of clients purchases tax services from their external audit firms 
(Cook and Omer 2012) and the audit firms‟ tax advisory role in such a case can create a less 
conservative view of tax risk.16,17 To test these possibilities, we propose the following hypothesis 
in alternative form: 
H2c: The association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation is weaker when the 
economic importance of fees received from the client firm is high, all else being equal. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Measures of tax aggressiveness  
 There is currently no single measure that perfectly captures tax aggressiveness. Lisowsky 
et al. (2012b) provide a continuum of the ability of specific measures of firms‟ tax attributes to 
capture tax aggressiveness. For the purpose of our paper, we focus on more aggressive tax 
                                                          
15 Prior studies provide mixed empirical evidence on this claim. While some studies show a positive relation 
between (audit and non-audit) fees and proxies for impaired independence (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Ferguson et al. 
2004; Gaver and Paterson 2007; Ghosh et al. 2009), others fail to find evidence of compromised auditor 
independence (DeFond et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Kinney et al. 2004, Chung and Kallapur 2003). 
16 When the proportion of tax fee to total client fee is high, it is possible that the audit firm will act as an advocate of 
their client‟s aggressive tax avoidance strategies and thus be less likely to resign. Alternatively, it is also possible 
that the auditor‟s provision of tax services increases the auditor‟s perceived litigation risk and the likelihood of 
resignation as long as the provision of tax services increases the probability of an auditor being sued for tax-related 
reasons, relative to auditors that do not provide tax services. 
17 The effect of auditors‟ tendency to charge higher fees to more tax aggressive clients (Donohoe and Knechel 2013; 
Hanlon et al. 2012) on our two measures of the client importance is minimal. For example, Hanlon et al. (2012) find 
that a 10 percent increase in the absolute book-tax difference increases audit fees by about $4,600, which translates 
into a +0.4 percent change in the ratio of client fees to total fees earned by the auditor at the office level and about -
0.4 percent change in the ratio of the client tax fees to client total fees, for a client firm with our sample mean tax 
fees and total fees that is audited by our sample mean sized auditor office. In robustness tests, we also add abnormal 
audit fees to our model to control for any endogeneity in audit fees. 
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planning because auditors are likely to be more concerned about these very risky tax activities. 
At the most aggressive end of the continuum resides tax sheltering. Tax shelters are aggressive 
tax positions that have little or no business purpose and do not subject the firm to any pre-tax 
economic risk or loss (Treasury 1999). Identifying tax shelters is a key for regulators and 
investors concerned with the aggressive nature of the tax positions of large publicly-held 
corporations (Treasury 1999; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Tax shelters generate substantial 
savings for a firm, but also introduce risk because the underlying tax positions have the lowest 
likelihood of being sustained upon tax audit. Moreover, tax shelters can involve complicated 
business structures that lead to rent extraction (Desai et al. 2007) or indicate aggressive financial 
reporting practices (Frank et al. 2009) that obscure poor performance or risk associated with the 
firm‟s business activities. Hence our first measure of tax aggressiveness is the tax shelter 
prediction score (Shelter) developed by Wilson (2009) and used in prior literature (e.g., Kim et al. 
2011; Rego and Wilson 2012). Shelter is computed as  
Shelterit = -4.86 + 5.20 * BTDit + 4.08 * DACit - 1.41 * LEVit + 0.76* Sizeit + 3.51 * ROAit  
               + 1.72 * Foreign_Incomeit + 2.43 * R&Dit                       (1) 
 
where BTD is book income less taxable income scaled by lagged total assets; DAC is the 
discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones Model; 
LEV is long-term debt divided by total assets; Size is the log of total assets. ROA is pre-tax 
earnings divided by total assets; Foregin_Income is foreign pre-tax earnings divided by lagged 
total assets; R&D is research and development expenditure divided by lagged total assets. We 
use the annual decile rank of Shelter to reduce noise in the estimates and to mitigate concerns 
with non-linearity. We standardize these decile ranks to range between zero and one, with 
observations in the bottom decile taking the value of zero and observations in the top decile 
taking the value of one. We denote this standardized rank-transformed variable as Rank_ Shelter. 
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Researchers typically consider permanent book-tax differences, a subset of BTD, as more 
aggressive because permanent BTD reduces the firm‟s tax liability while increasing after-tax 
reported financial income (Shevlin 2002). Hence our second measure that we utilize is 
discretionary permanent book-tax differences (DTAX) based on Frank et al. (2009), which is 
defined as the residuals from the regression of permanent differences on several determinants of 
nondiscretionary permanent differences unrelated to tax planning (estimated by year and two-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, with at least 20 firms in each industry; firm 
and time subscripts omitted): 
PERMDIFFit = α0 + α1(1/ATLAGit) + α2INTANGit + α3UNCONit + α4MIit + α5CSTEit  
+ α6ΔNOLit + α7LAGPERMit + εit            (2) 
 
where PERMDIFF refers to total book-tax differences (BTD) less temporary book-tax-
differences (TXDI/STR), ATLAG refers to lagged total assets (AT), INTANG refers to goodwill 
and other intangibles (INTAN), UNCON refers to income/loss reported under the equity method 
(ESUB), MI refers to income/loss attributable to minority interest (MII), CSTE refers to current 
state tax expense (TXS), ΔNOL refers to the change in net operating loss carry forwards (TLCF) 
and LAGPERM is the lagged PERMDIFF. PERMDIFF, INTANG, UNCON, MI, CSTE and 
ΔNOL are all scaled by lagged total assets. We also decile rank DTAX annually to reduce noise in 
the estimates, and standardize these decile ranks to range between zero and one, with 
observations in the bottom decile taking the value of zero and observations in the top decile 
taking the value of one. We denote this variable as Rank_DTAX. 
3.2 Empirical models 
3.2.1 Main analysis 
To test whether tax aggressiveness (TAXAGG) is associated with auditor resignations, we 
estimate the following logistic regression model adapted from Landsman et al. (2009): 
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Resignit+1 = β0 + β1 TAXAGGit + β2 Sales_Growthit + β3 Abs_DAit + β4 Inv_Recit + β5 GCMit 
              + β6 Cleanit+ β7 Tenureit + β8 ROAit + β9 Lossit + β10 Leverageit+ β11 Cashit  
  + β12Disagreeit + β13 Rep_Eventit + β14 BigNit + β15 Ln_MVit + β16 Mergerit  
  + β17 Mismatchit  + Year Dummies + eit                        (3) 
 
The details of the variables used in the model are defined in Table 1. Consistent with 
prior studies (e.g., Landsman et al. 2009; Kim and Park 2009), we estimate this model using 
auditor switch firms and measure all of the independent variables in the year prior to the auditor 
switch. Supporting the appropriateness of one-year lagged independent variables in the model, 
Grothe and Weirich (2007) report that most auditor changes occur in the months after a client‟s 
fiscal year-end and typically soon after the year‟s audit is completed. The dependent variable 
(Resign) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the auditor resigns and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the 
auditor is dismissed).18 A positive coefficient on TAXAGG is consistent with auditors resigning 
more frequently from their tax-aggressive clients.   
3.2.2 Cross-sectional analyses 
 To test H2, we modify equation (3) to include the conditioning variable 
(Conditional_VAR) and the interaction between TAXAGG and Conditional_VAR: 
Resignit+1 = β0 + β1 TAXAGGit + β2 Sales_Growthit + β3 Abs_DAit + β4 Inv_Recit + β5 GCMit 
              + β6 Cleanit+ β7 Tenureit + β8 ROAit + β9 Lossit + β10 Leverageit+ β11 Cashit  
  + β12 Disagreeit + β13 Rep_Eventit + β14 BigNit + β15 Ln_MVit + β16 Mergerit 
  + β17 Mismatchit + β18 Conditional_VARit + β19 TAXAGG*Conditional_VARit  
  + Year Dummies + eit                  (4) 
For H2a, we examine the moderating effect of outside monitoring on the relation between 
                                                          
18 Firms that do not provide a reason for an auditor change are coded as 0 in our sample. It is possible that in some 
of these cases, the auditor resigns but the audit firm and client mutually agree not to state it as an auditor resignation 
because the audit firm might want to maintain good relations with the client for other non-audit related work, 
especially for larger clients. Hence, the number of firms with auditor resignations could be understated in our 
sample. However, this measurement error likely adds more noise to our tests and biases against finding significant 
results. We also note that TAXAGG is a choice variable for the client firm while Resign is a choice variable by the 
audit firm. Thus TAXAGG is not endogenous in the traditional sense. Further, given the extensive number of control 
variables in equation (3), we believe our results are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables correlated with 
TAXAGG. 
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tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation using two proxies. The first is analyst following 
(Analyst) because prior work suggests that analysts serve as external monitors to the firm and 
provide additional scrutiny over managers‟ actions (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976). Yu (2008) 
finds that firms followed by more analysts are associated with lower earnings management. Dyck 
et al. (2010) also document that analysts play a role in detecting corporate fraud. Therefore, we 
expect firms with greater analysts following to have more effective outside monitoring. The 
second is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors (Institutions). Previous studies 
(e.g., Grossman and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Huddart 1993) suggest that large 
shareholders have incentives to undertake monitoring or other costly control activities when the 
increased returns from such monitoring activities are sufficient to cover their associated costs. 
Chung et al. (2002) find evidence that the presence of large institutional shareholdings inhibit 
managers from managing accruals to achieve a desired level of earnings. Therefore, we expect 
firms with a greater percentage of shares held by institutions to have more effective outside 
monitoring. Based on H2a, we expect β19 to be negative in equation (4). 
For H2b, we examine the moderating effect of agency costs on the relation between tax 
aggressiveness and auditor resignation. We use two proxies to measure agency costs. The first is 
free cash flow (FCF) in low growth firms suggested by Jensen (1986). When there is little FCF, 
managers have fewer economic resources to squander. Investment in additional projects has to be 
financed by external funds from the capital market, where managers will be subject to extra 
monitoring (Stulz 1999). The extra monitoring by the capital market could force managers to 
reduce their expropriations, since new investors will not buy new shares unless they are 
compensated for agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Thus, the potential damage from 
overinvestment to existing shareholders would be lower. In contrast, managers of firms with high 
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FCF can finance investments by internal funds and therefore avoid extra monitoring from the 
capital market. In this case, the potential damage from overinvestment to existing shareholders 
would be higher (Lang et al. 1991; Lamont 1997). Hence, when FCF is high, the marginal effect 
of tax aggressiveness on auditor resignation should be more pronounced. We define 
Free_cashflow, an indicator variable, which equals 1 if the firm is in the high FCF and low sales 
growth portfolios, 0 otherwise.19 Based on H2b, we expect β19 to be positive in equation (4). 
Our second proxy is measured based on the firms‟ managerial ownership (LaFond and 
Roychowdhury 2008). Agency problems arise when the interests of managers and shareholders 
are not aligned. It has long been recognized that managers‟ interests are less aligned with 
shareholders when there is greater separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). We measure the potential misalignment of interests using the percentage of shares owned 
by key executives in the firms, and denote the variable as Mgtown. The higher the Mgtown, the 
greater the alignment of interests, and hence the lower the agency costs between managers and 
shareholders. Hence, we expect the relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation 
to be weaker when managerial ownership is high, predicting the coefficient on β19 to be negative. 
 Finally for H2c, we examine the moderating effect of the economic importance of the 
client using two proxies. The first is client importance (C_Impt) measured by the client total fees 
relative to the total fees earned by the audit office (Chung and Kallapur 2003). The second is the 
proportion of client tax fee relative to the client total fee (Taxfee). We posit that the relation 
between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation is weaker when the economic importance of 
the client is higher. Hence, based on H2c, we expect β19 to be negative in equation (4).  
                                                          
19 We use cash flow from operations and investment opportunities to identify the firms with potentially severe 
agency problems. Firms that hold a lot of cash but do not have good investment opportunities are more likely to face 
potential agency problems from FCF. We measure FCF as cash flow from operations minus cash dividends and 
scaled by lagged total assets. We use sales growth to measure the investment opportunities of a firm. Thereafter, we 
sort FCF and sales growth annually for all firms in the population to obtain the 2x2 portfolios. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Sample 
We collect our data primarily from Audit Analytics, Compustat, I/B/E/S, and Thomson 
Reuters databases in computing the dependent variable, tax aggressiveness, other control 
variables, and the hypothesized intervening variables. The sample period for the current study 
spans 2000-2010. The sample period starts in 2000 because auditor resignation data from Audit 
Analytics are available from 2000. As in prior studies (e.g., Landsman et al. 2009), we exclude 
firms in the financial industries (i.e., SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and exclude auditor switches from 
former Andersen clients in 2001-2002. Our main sample consists of 4,513 auditor change 
observations. Of these observations, about 27 percent represent auditor resignations while the 
remaining are client-initiated dismissals. The smaller proportion of auditor resignations relative 
to dismissals is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Landsman et al. 2009; Kim and Park 2009). 
The sample size varies for each test depending on data availability for the specific 
measure used in the test. For example, sample size is typically larger when tax aggressiveness is 
measured by the tax sheltering probability (Rank_shelter) compared to the discretionary 
permanent book-tax differences (Rank_DTAX), because of more stringent data requirements to 
compute the latter variable. Similarly, models using free cash flow (Free_cashflow) to proxy for 
agency costs as the intervening variables have relatively larger sample size compared to models 
using institutional ownership (Institutions) or management ownership (Mgtown) because of the 
more limited coverage in the Thomson Reuters compared to the Compustat database. We also 
truncate each continuous variable used for each model at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. The final sample size used in the regression analyses ranges from 2,539 to 
4,513 firm-year observations. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation analyses 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in our main regressions 
by the type of auditor changes: resignation versus dismissal. The mean and median values of the 
two tax aggressiveness proxies (Rank_Shelter and Rank_DTAX) for the sample of auditor 
resignations are higher than those for the sample of client-initiated auditor dismissals, and these 
differences are significant at the 1% level based on both t-tests and Wilcoxon z-tests, 
respectively. Hence, the univariate analyses provide some preliminary evidence that auditor 
resignations are associated with greater tax aggressiveness than client-initiated dismissals. Panel 
A also reveals that the auditor resignation firms report significantly higher absolute discretionary 
accruals (Abs_DA), longer audit tenure (Tenure), lower profitability (ROA), lower leverage 
(Leverage), less analyst following (Analyst), lower institutional ownership (Institutions), lower 
free cash flows (Free_cashflow), higher managerial ownership (Mgtown), and higher client total 
fees relative to total fees at the office level (C_impt) than the auditor dismissal firms. Further, the 
auditor resignation firms also have a higher likelihood of reporting a loss (Loss), a higher 
likelihood of a receiving a going concern opinion (GCM), a higher probability of a reportable 
event (Rep_Event), a lower likelihood to be audited by a Big N audit firm, and a lower likelihood 
to be engaged in a merger or acquisition (Merger) than the auditor dismissal firms. These results 
are largely consistent with prior studies (e.g., Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Kim and Park 2009). 
We control for these variables in multivariate analyses. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the distribution of auditor changes by year. There are 
significant increases in auditor resignations and dismissals in 2002-2004. This increase could be 
due to auditors‟ capacity constraints and their adjustment of tolerance for client risk as SOX 
27 
 
increases both the workload and risk exposure of auditors. 20  Some clients could also have 
dismissed larger auditors in an attempt to reduce fees. Given these confounding factors 
surrounding auditor switches in the years subsequent to the enactment of SOX, we include year 
fixed-effects in our regressions. Additionally, we also repeat all analyses after excluding the 
years 2002-2004 from our sample and find that our inferences remain unchanged.  
If an auditor resigns from a client because of the client‟s tax aggressiveness, we expect 
the replacement auditor to be of a “lower quality”, that is, one that will more likely go along with 
the client‟s tax aggressiveness. To provide some descriptive statistics on this contention, we 
examine the differences in tax aggressiveness of the 1,128 auditor resignation firms classified 
based on whether the departing and the replacement auditor is a Big 5 or non-Big 5 auditor. 
Group 1 and Group 4 represent cases where the auditor switch is lateral (either from Big 5 to Big 
5 or from non-Big 5 to non-Big 5), and Group 2 and Group 3 represent cases where the auditor 
switch is downward (from Big 5 to non-Big 5) and upward (from non-Big 5 to Big 5), 
respectively. Panel B of Table 2 reports the mean and median Rank_Shelter for the four groups. 
Consistent with our expectations, the mean and median Rank_Shelter for the downward switch 
firms are significantly higher than the lateral switch and upward switch firms, suggesting that 
replacement auditors of tax aggressiveness clients tend to be of relatively lower quality than the 
                                                          
20 The PCAOB also introduced Auditing Standard (AS) 2 and AS 3 in 2004 to coincide with the implementation of 
SOX. The new auditing standards further increase the workload and risk exposure of auditors. Specifically, AS 2, An 
Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements, 
requires auditors to issue an opinion on the effectiveness of their public company clients‟ internal control. AS 3, 
Audit Documentation, establishes general requirements for documentation the auditor should prepare and retain in 
connection with engagements conducted pursuant to the standards of the PCAOB. Such engagements include an 
audit of financial statements, an audit of internal control over financial reporting, and a review of interim financial 
information. Moreover, Ettredge et al. (2007) note an increase in auditor dismissals at the time of SOX 404 
implementation and Ettredge et al. (2011) find that companies receiving adverse internal control opinions are more 
likely to subsequently dismiss their auditors. These factors could have also contributed to the increase in auditor 
changes during 2002-2004. 
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resigning auditors. Though not tabulated, we find similar results when the mean and median 
Rank_DTAX by departing and replacement auditor are examined. 
Table 3 reports the Pearson‟s correlations among the variables used in the auditor 
resignation model. We do not find any unusual correlations that raise concerns about 
multicollinearity. Both the Rank_Shelter and Rank_DTAX are positively correlated with the 
Resign indicator variable, confirming our finding in Table 2, and provide some initial evidence 
that an auditor is more likely to resign from a tax aggressive client. 
4.3 Logistic regression results for the effect of tax aggressiveness on auditor resignation 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression analyses on the 
association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation decision for our sample of auditor 
change firms. The table shows that the likelihood of auditor resignation vis-à-vis dismissal is 
higher when the firm is more tax aggressive, after controlling for factors that are known to affect 
the auditor resignation decision. Specifically, the coefficients on Rank_Shelter and Rank_DTAX 
are positive and significant at the 1 percent level (Wald=21.90 and 24.68, respectively), 
consistent with H1. To assess the economic significance, we calculate the marginal effect of tax 
aggressiveness on the propensity of auditor resignation. The marginal effect indicates the change 
in the probability of auditor resignation when the tax aggressiveness measure increases from zero 
to one (holding other independent variables constant).21 With one unit increase in Rank_shelter 
and Rank_DTAX, the probability of auditor resignation increases by 12.6% and 13.2% 
respectively. Hence, the evidence indicates that the relation between tax aggressiveness and 
auditor resignation is economically nontrivial. 
                                                          
21 The marginal effect for one unit increase in tax aggressiveness measure is computed as p x (1-p) x b, where p is 
the base rate (25% for the model using Rank_shelter and 26.4% for the model using Rank_DTAX) and b is the 
estimated coefficient from the logistic regression (Liao 1994). 
29 
 
For the set of control variables, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Kim et al. 2009; 
Landsman et al. 2009), the likelihood of auditor resignation is significantly higher for clients 
having disagreements with their auditors (Disagree), going concern opinions (GCM), and the 
presence of a reportable event (Rep_Event). Absolute discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) and net 
loss (Loss) are both significantly positively while firm size (Size) and the use of a Big N auditor 
(BigN) are both significantly negatively associated with the likelihood of auditor resignation.22  
To mitigate the concern that omitted correlated variables are driving our results, we also 
utilize a change regression specification. Specifically, we regress auditor resignation decision on 
the change in tax aggressiveness measures and the changes in other continuous control variables, 
and assume that the endogeneity resulting from the omitted correlated variables are stationary 
over time. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 4. Consistent with our earlier analyses, 
we find that an increase in tax aggressiveness (ΔTAXAGG) is significantly associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of auditor resignation (Resign). 
In sum, the results in Table 4 suggest that tax aggressiveness can heighten the auditor‟s 
litigation and reputational risk and the conflicts with managers, thereby triggering auditor 
resignation. Specifically, we interpret this result as auditors being more likely to resign from tax 
aggressive clients because their perceived client risk in such firms is exceedingly high, as 
managers in those firms have incentives to conceal their opportunistic rent diversion and related 
accounting irregularities from the investigation of auditors. In the following section, we examine 
how the strength of external monitoring, the potentials for agency problems in the client firm, 
                                                          
22 Although not tabulated, we attempt to control for internal control weakness (ICW) using the data in the post-SOX 
period. Specifically, ICW is set equal to 1 if management disclose a material internal control weakness under SOX 
Sections 302 or 404, or the auditor issues an adverse opinion on the firm‟s internal controls over financial reporting 
under Section 404, and 0 otherwise. We find that while the coefficient on ICW is positive and significant 
(Wald=12.54 and 12.99 respectively), TAXAGG remains positive and significant (Wald=21.14 and 27.82 
respectively) in this analysis. 
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and the economic importance of the client moderate the relationship between tax aggressiveness 
and auditor resignation decision. 
4.4 Regression results on the cross-sectional analyses on the effect of tax aggressiveness on 
auditor resignation 
 
Table 5 presents the results on whether the likelihood that an auditor resigns from a tax 
aggressive client varies with the strength of external monitoring.23 Panels A and B show the 
results when we proxy the strength of external monitoring by analyst following (Analyst) and 
institutional ownership (Institutions), respectively. As shown in Panel A, the likelihood that an 
auditor resigns from a tax aggressive client decreases when the analyst following is high. 
Specifically, the coefficients on the interaction terms Rank_Shelter*Analyst and 
Rank_DTAX*Analyst are negative and significant at the 1 percent level (Wald = 7.27 and 6.44, 
respectively). Panel B also reveals that when institutional ownership is high, the auditor is less 
likely to resign from a tax aggressive client. Specifically, the coefficients on the interaction terms 
Rank_Shelter*Institutions and Rank_DTAX*Institutions are negative and significant at the 1 
percent level (Wald=10.79 and 8.41, respectively). Hence the results in Table 5 are consistent 
with H2a that to the extent that strong external monitoring mechanisms curb agency problems 
and managerial opportunism arising from tax aggressiveness activities, auditor‟s perceived 
litigation and reputation risks are alleviated.   
Next, we test how the association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation 
varies with the potentials for agency problems in client firms. Panels A and B of Table 6 present 
the results when we use free cash flows (Free_Cashflow) and managerial ownership (Mgtown), 
                                                          
23Ai and Norton (2003) provide an alternative computation for calculating the directional effect and statistical 
significance of interactions in nonlinear models. However, Greene (2010) concludes that an overall statistical 
inference cannot be obtained from the Ai and Norton (2003) measure. Furthermore, Kolasinski and Seigel (2010) 
ague that it is appropriate to draw inferences from the interaction term in nonlinear models. Therefore, we use the 
interaction coefficient to assess the directional effect of our results. 
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respectively, to capture the extent of agency problems. Panel A shows that the coefficients on 
Rank_Shelter*Free_Cashflow and Rank_DTAX*Free_Cashflow are positive and significant at 
the 5 percent level (Wald=6.06 and 5.62, respectively). In Panel B, the coefficients on 
Rank_Shelter*Mgtown and Rank_DTAX*Mgtown are negative and significant at the 10 percent 
level (Wald=3.99 and 3.46, respectively). These results are consistent with our prediction in H2b 
that greater agency problems in a tax aggressive firm, as indicated by higher free cash flows and 
lower managerial ownership, further increases the likelihood that an auditor resigns from the 
audit engagements with tax aggressive clients. This result provides further support that 
managerial opportunism and rent diversion associated with tax avoidance activities are important 
concerns in auditors‟ client retention decisions, augmenting the agency theory argument for the 
possible association between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation.  
Finally, Table 7 presents the results on how the economic importance of client fees 
moderates the relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation. In Panel A, we report 
the results when we proxy fee dependence using the total fees received from the client relative to 
total fees earned at the auditor office level (C_Impt). We find that the coefficients on 
Rank_Shelter*C_Impt and Rank_DTAX*C_Impt are negative and significant at the 1 percent 
level (Wald=7.50 and 7.11, respectively).24 In Panel B, we report the results when we use the 
proportion of client tax fees relative to client total fees to proxy for fee dependence (Taxfee). The 
coefficient on Rank_Shelter*Taxfee is negative and significant at the 1 percent level 
(Wald=11.77), and the coefficient on Rank_DTAX*Taxfee is negative but not significant at 
                                                          
24 The positive and significant coefficient on C_impt appears counter-intuitive. However, when we remove the 
interaction terms Rank_Shelter*C_Impt and Rank_DTAX*C_Impt, the coefficient on C_impt becomes positive but 
statistically insignificant (Wald statistics = 0.35 and 0.44, respectively).  
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conventional levels (Wald=0.48).25, 26 Overall, the results presented in Table 7 are consistent 
with H2c that the positive relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation is weaker 
when the economic importance of the audit engagement is higher. Specifically, higher fee 
importance and tax service fees are likely to cause the auditor to become less skeptical towards 
the client‟s tax aggressiveness behavior, resulting in a lower likelihood that the auditor resigns 
from a tax aggressive client.  
Overall, our empirical results suggest that aggressive tax behavior increases the audit and 
litigation risks of auditors and such risks cannot be substantially remediated in audit procedures 
with managers who have incentives to conceal their rent diversion from opaque tax transactions, 
hence causing the auditor to resign from the audit engagement. Further, auditors are more 
concerned about the complementarities between tax aggressiveness and the opportunistic 
behavior of managers when the external monitoring over the client firm is weaker and when the 
potential for agency conflicts in the client firm is higher. Hence, auditors are even more likely to 
resign from those clients. On the other hand, higher economic importance of audit and tax fees is 
likely to cause the auditor to be more willing to take on risks from tax aggressive behavior and 
less likely to resign from the client.  
5. Additional analyses 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results by conducting a series of 
                                                          
25 We also examine whether the auditor resignation decision is influenced by whether the auditor is an industry 
specialist or tax-specific industry specialist. When we interact the tax aggressiveness measures with indicator 
variables that indicate whether the auditor is an industry specialist (IND_EXPERT) or tax-specific industry specialist 
(TAX_EXPERT) measured at the office level based on 2-digit SIC industry code, we fail to find significant results. 
In addition, when we interact Rank_Shelter*Taxfee and Rank_DTAX*Taxfee with each of IND_EXPERT and 
TAX_EXPERT, all the three way interaction variables are also not significant. These results suggest that auditor 
industry and tax expertise have no incremental effect on auditor‟s decision to resign from tax aggressive clients.  
26 In untabulated analysis, we use the ratio of non-audit fees to total client fees (NASFee) and logged non-audit fees 
(LnNASFee) as alternative fee dependence measures and include their interactions with our tax aggressiveness 
measures in the model. Similar to the result in Panel B of Table 7, we find that Rank_Shelter*NASFee is negative 
and significant at the 5 percent level (Wald=4.52), while Rank_DTAX*NASFee is negative and insignificant 
(Wald=2.41). However, we find that both Rank_Shelter*LnNASFee and Rank_DTAX*LnNASFee are negative and 
significant at conventional levels (Wald=10.42 and 5.00, respectively). 
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sensitivity analyses and report the results in Table 8. Although all control variables are included 
in the empirical specifications, we report only the coefficients and significance levels for our 
measures of tax aggressiveness and variables of interest for brevity. 
5.1 Alternative measures for tax aggressiveness  
As argued earlier, we choose two measures that capture the more extreme forms of tax 
avoidance behavior because we want to explore the consequence of more aggressive and opaque 
management tax behavior on auditor resignation decisions. Lisowsky et al. (2012b) argue and 
provide evidence that the unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) disclosed by a firm pursuant to FIN 48 
is a superior predictor of tax shelter activity. Hence, we use UTB as an alternative measure of tax 
aggressiveness.27 Column 1 of Table 8, Panel A reports the result. Although the sample size is 
much smaller for this test, we still find that the coefficient on UTB is positive and significant at 
the 10 percent level, consistent with our earlier findings.    
Next, we examine how the main results vary with measures that capture less extreme 
forms of tax aggressiveness. Lisowsky et al. (2012b) suggest that the probability of engaging in 
tax sheltering (Shelter), discretionary permanent book-tax difference (DTAX), permanent book-
tax difference (PBTD), book-tax difference (BTD), and cash effective tax rates (CETR) capture 
the varying degree of tax aggressiveness, from most aggressive to least aggressive. We replicate 
the results in Table 4 using PBTD, BTD, and CETR, and present the results in the second to 
fourth columns of Panel A, Table 8. Both the coefficients on PBTD and BTD are positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level while that on CETR is not significant. These results suggest 
that the positive relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation weaken for 
                                                          
27 The advantage of using UTB as a proxy for tax aggressiveness is that it is not confounded by other accounting 
variables and thus is less prone to measurement errors, while the disadvantage is that the sample size for this test 
(n=312) is much smaller compared to those using Shelter and DTAX because the data on UTB are only available 
from 2007. 
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measures that capture less extreme form of tax aggressiveness; this supports the appropriateness 
of using Shelter and DTAX as the measures of tax aggressiveness for the purpose in this study.28   
5.2 Controlling for financial reporting risk 
Following prior literature, we control for absolute discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) in our 
resignation model to examine the direct effect of tax avoidance on auditor resignation beyond 
and above its indirect effect through accruals manipulation. To more carefully examine whether 
financial reporting risk that could be associated with our tax aggressiveness measures is likely to 
explain our findings, we repeat each of our tests by using three alternative proxies for financial 
reporting risk: predicted accounting restatement score (Fscore) based on Dechow et al. (2011), 
total accruals (HACC) as in Hanlon et al. (2012)29, and accruals quality (AQ) developed by 
Francis et al. (2005).30 The results, reported in Panels B, C, and D of Table 8, reveal that the 
coefficients on Rank_Shelter and Rank_DTAX continue to be significantly positive at 
conventional levels, indicating that our main result is robust to the inclusion of various proxies 
for financial reporting risk.31   
Next, we examine whether the positive association between tax aggressiveness and 
auditor resignation is higher for clients that have higher financial reporting risk. For this purpose, 
we repeat our tests after adding the interaction variables between our tax avoidance proxies and 
financial reporting risk measures into the model. The results reported in the last two columns of 
                                                          
28  We also find that the interaction between PBTD, BTD, and CETR and our conditioning variables are not 
significant in most cases. We do not examine the interaction between UTB and the conditioning variables because 
the data requirements on the conditioning variables further limit the sample size for the H2 tests.  
29 Following Hanlon et al. (2012), HACC is defined as an indicator variable that equals 1 for observations in the top 
decile of total accruals scaled by beginning total assets, and 0 otherwise.  
30  Specifically, we estimate pooled industry-year cross-sectional regressions with total current accruals as the 
dependent variable, and employ cash flow in the previous, current, and subsequent years and changes in revenue and 
PPE as independent variables. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002, see footnote 6) and Srinidhi and Gul (2007), 
we use the absolute value of the residuals from these regressions as our (inverse) measure of accruals quality (AQ). 
The sample size for this sensitivity check is smaller due to additional data requirements. 
31  Our unreported results also indicate that the interaction between tax avoidance and the other conditioning 
variables continues to be significant as in main tables after including these alternative metrics for financial reporting 
risk in the regression model. 
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Panels B, C, and D show that the interaction variables are all statistically insignificant, indicating 
that the relation between tax avoidance and auditor resignation is not statistically different 
between firms with a high level of financial reporting risk and firms with a low level of financial 
reporting risk. These results suggest that financial reporting risk that can be associated with tax 
aggressiveness does not appear to be the dominating force that causes auditor resignations. 
Finally, we split our sample into two sub-samples using the median of each of predicted 
accounting restatement score, total accruals, and accruals quality, and repeat the test in Table 4 
(while removing Abs_DA) for each subsample. Untabulated results reveal that our proxies for tax 
aggressiveness continue to be positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of 
auditor resignation in each subsample, suggesting that our main results in Table 4 are not driven 
by a subset of client firms with extreme financial reporting risk.  
5.3 Non-auditor change sample as control firms 
As discussed earlier, the control firms used in the resignation tests are those that 
dismissed auditors because firms that switch auditors are different in many perspectives from the 
population of firms that do not switch auditors. To test the sensitivity of our results, we repeat 
our auditor resignation test in Table 4 by using a larger set of control firms that do not change 
auditors. We exclude the variables Disagree and Rep_Events from the model for this sensitivity 
check because these variables are relevant only to auditor-switching clients. The results, 
presented in Panel E of Table 8, are consistent with the main results. Specifically, we continue to 
find positive and significant coefficients on Rank_Shelter and Rank_DTAX at the 1 percent 
level.32 
5.4 Pre- and post-SOX periods analyses 
                                                          
32 We repeat all our cross-sectional analyses tests using this alternative control sample. Most coefficients on the 
variables of interest, i.e., the interactions between tax aggressiveness and the conditioning variables, are significant 
at 10% level or lower and in the same direction as reported in the main tables.  
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Landsman et al. (2009) find that the collapse of Andersen as well as the internal reporting 
requirements brought about by Section 404 of SOX cause changes in the Big N auditor 
sensitivity to client misalignment and client risk in the post-SOX period. SOX also prohibited 
certain types of auditor-provided nonaudit services including some tax services. Furthermore, 
Maydew and Shackelford (2007) conjecture that the tax provision is an increased source of 
conflict between auditor and client after the passage of SOX and regulatory actions by SEC and 
PCAOB. Graham et al. (2013) via survey of over 500 tax directors provide evidence that 
splitting the audit and tax service providers increased tension between the client firm and their 
auditor. Thus, as a sensitivity check, we examine how the relation between tax aggressiveness 
and auditor‟s resignation decision differs between the pre- and post-SOX period and report the 
results in Panel F of Table 8. Both measures of tax aggressiveness are associated with auditor 
resignation in the post-SOX period but not in the pre-SOX period in each period subsample 
analysis. In addition, the interactions between the indicator of the post-SOX period (SOX) and 
the tax aggressiveness measures in the pooled regression are positive and significant while the 
coefficients on tax aggressiveness measures, which capture the relation in the pre-SOX period, 
are insignificant. These results indicate that the positive association between tax aggressiveness 
and auditor resignation prevails only for the post-SOX period in which the legal liability for 
auditors and the scrutiny of regulators over audit quality are heightened.  
5.5 Controlling for abnormal audit fees  
Donohoe and Knechel (2013) find that an audit fee premium attributable to tax 
aggressiveness is incremental to premiums relating to an auditor‟s general concerns about 
earnings management via the tax accounts. To examine whether the effect of tax aggressiveness 
on auditor resignation remains in the existence of an audit fee premium, we further control for 
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abnormal audit fees (Abn_fees) in our regressions.33 Panel G of Table 8 presents the results after 
including Abn_fees in Equation (3). The coefficients on Rank_Shelter and Rank_DTAX continue 
to be significantly positive at conventional levels. This result suggests that charging higher audit 
fees  does not totally eliminate the audit risks associated with a tax aggressive client, hence 
leading to auditor resignation. Next, when we interact abnormal audit fees with our tax 
aggressiveness proxies, we find that the coefficients on the interaction terms 
Rank_Shelter*Abn_fees and Rank_Shelter*Abn_fees are both significantly negative at the 
conventional levels. This latter result suggests that while increased client audit fees  does not 
totally eliminate the audit risks associated with a tax aggressive client, they help alleviate the 
auditor‟s concerns over a tax aggressive client and reduce the likelihood of a resignation decision.  
5.6 Results with sub-sample of Big N clients only 
Our sample includes the clients of both Big N and non-Big N auditors because of the 
small number of Big N auditor resignations (396). Although our models include a control for the 
indicator of Big N auditors, the choice of Big N auditors and their higher exposure to litigation 
and reputation risk may potentially confound our results. Thus, we repeat our analysis after 
restricting the sample to client firms audited by Big N auditors. The results, reported in Panel H 
of Table 8, show that the coefficients on Rank_Shelter and Rank_DTAX remain positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level. Next, because some audit firms have been very aggressive in 
selling tax shelters or tax avoidance services, we check whether there are audit firm specific 
effects. Specifically, we include an indicator variable for each Big N auditor, as well as its 
interaction with our tax aggressiveness measures into our regression model (one Big N auditor at 
a time) and repeat the test. Untabulated results show that all the indicator and interaction 
variables are statistically insignificant. These results indicate that resignations among the Big N 
                                                          
33 The measurement of abnormal audit fees is detailed in Table 8.  
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auditors are not less likely by certain Big N audit firms that are known as aggressive tax advice 
seller. 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines whether client tax aggressiveness affects an auditor‟s decision to 
resign from audit engagements. We posit that tax aggressiveness can heighten the litigation and 
reputation risks facing the auditors. Moreover, managers‟ incentives to hide their opportunistic 
behavior related to tax aggressiveness can create potential conflicts with auditors, and tax 
aggressiveness behavior calls into question the integrity and risk profile of management. Despite 
the risk associated with tax aggressiveness, auditors will not resign if they are able to offset the 
risk through exerting more efforts and charging higher fees or if the client tax advocacy role 
prevails over the auditor‟s desire to limit exposure to litigation risk.  
 Using a large number of firms that switch auditors over 2000-2010, we examine this ex 
ante unclear relation and find a positive association between our proxies for tax aggressiveness 
and auditor resignation. We also find that the positive association is stronger when external 
monitoring of the client firm is less effective and when there is greater potential for agency 
problems in the client firm. These findings suggest that tax aggressiveness heightens the 
concerns of auditors over litigation and reputational risks and potential conflicts with managers, 
hence triggering auditor resignation, when auditing clients with weaker external monitoring or 
with greater potentials for agency conflicts. Finally, we find that and the association is weaker 
when the economic importance of audit and tax fees received from the client is higher, 
suggesting that the fee importance and non-audit tax service lowers auditors‟ incentives to resign. 
Our study extends the existing literature by examining how a firm‟s tax aggressiveness 
affects the external auditor‟s behavior and suggests that corporate tax avoidance is an important 
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risk factor that influences the auditor‟s resignation decision. Given the pervasiveness of tax 
aggressiveness among U.S. firms, the negative effect of aggressive tax behavior on the auditor-
client relationship should be noted for the healthy development of the audit assurance industry. 
Moreover, to the extent that the auditor resignation is viewed negatively in the market, this study 
implies that the shareholders of tax aggressive firms must bear additional “non-tax costs” 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, 146) that have not been previously documented.  
Our study is subject to a few caveats. First, although we control for several alternative 
metrics of financial reporting risk in our resignation model and find that our main results are not 
sensitive to these alternative metrics, we cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that tax 
aggressiveness could still be proxying for financial reporting risks. Second, to the extent that an 
auditor resigns but the audit firm and client mutually agree not to state it as an auditor 
resignation in the client firm‟s 8-K filing, the number of firms with auditor resignations could be 
understated in our sample. Finally, because we use a lag variable for tax aggressiveness, our 
study will not pick up cases where the auditor resigns before the firm plans on or does enter into 
tax sheltering activities. 
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Table 1 
Variables Definition. 
 
 
Resign 
 
= 
 
1 if the auditor resigns, and 0 otherwise (dismissed); 
 
Tax aggressiveness 
Rank_Shelter = Decile rank of tax aggressiveness based on Wilson (2009); scaled 
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher tax aggressiveness; 
Rank_DTAX = Decile rank of tax aggressiveness based on Frank et al. (2009), 
scaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher tax 
aggressiveness; 
 
Intervening variables 
Analyst =  Number of analyst covering the firm, number set to zero if the firm is 
not listed in I/B/E/S; 
Institutions = Institutional ownership; 
Free_cashflow = 1 if the free cash flow (measured by operating cash flow minus 
capital expenditure minus dividend payment, scaled by beginning 
assets) is above the population median, and sales growth (measured 
by the percentage change in sales, scaled by total assets) over the 
previous year is below the population median.  
Mgtown = Ownership held by executives; 
C_impt = client total fees relative to total fees at the office level; 
Taxfee = client tax fees relative to client total fees; 
 
Control variables 
Sales_growth = growth in sales; 
Abs_DA = absolute values of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
(measured by the modified-Jones model); 
Inv_rec = sum of inventories and receivables, divided by beginning total assets; 
GCM = 1 if the firm receives a going concern modified opinion, and 0 
otherwise; 
Clean = 1 if the auditor issues clean, unqualified report, and 0 otherwise; 
Tenure = auditor tenure in years; 
ROA = income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets; 
Loss =        1 if firm is reporting a loss and 0 otherwise; 
Leverage = total debts to assets ratio; 
Cash = cash deflated by total assets; 
Disagree = 1 if the 8-K filing discloses an accounting disagreement with the 
incumbent auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
Rep_event = 1 if the 8-K filing discloses a reportable event, and 0 otherwise; 
BigN = 1 if the firm is audited by a Big N audit firm, and 0 otherwise; 
Ln_MV = Log of market capitalization; 
Merger = 1 if the firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise; 
Mismatch = 1 if the company is mismatched with the incumbent auditor, 
following the methodology in Shu (2000), and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the auditor resignation model 
 
Resign=1 (n=1,128) Resign=0 (n=3,385) Difference 
 
Mean Median Mean Median t- value z-value 
Rank_Shelter 0.53 0.56 0.50 0.56 3.05*** 3.98*** 
Rank_DTAX 0.54 0.56 0.48 0.44 3.87*** 3.05*** 
Sale_growth 0.54 0.03 0.85 0.04 -1.56 -0.20 
Abs_DA 1.18 0.21 1.08 0.17 1.23 2.82*** 
Inv_Rec 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.23 -0.11 -0.53 
GCM 0.32 0.00 0.26 0.00 3.87*** 3.98*** 
Clean 0.53 1.00 0.53 1.00 -0.11 -0.11 
Tenure 4.11 2.00 4.02 1.00 0.51 3.50*** 
ROA -0.20 -0.09 -0.23 -0.04 -0.69 -2.43** 
Loss 0.65 1.00 0.58 1.00 3.75*** 3.75*** 
Leverage 0.21 0.02 0.23 0.04 -0.88 -2.44** 
Cash 0.29 0.10 0.32 0.09 -1.18 1.10 
Disagree 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 2.74*** 2.74*** 
Rep_Event 0.18 0.00 0.14 0.00 2.67*** 2.67*** 
BigN 0.35 0.00 0.37 0.00 -13.22*** -11.69*** 
Ln_MV 3.30 3.34 3.93 3.80 -7.55*** -7.02*** 
Merger 0.14 0.00 0.19 0.00 -4.06*** -3.81*** 
Mismatch 0.18 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.25 1.25 
Analyst 1.16 0.00 1.95 0.00 -7.08*** -6.23*** 
Institutions 0.24 0.10 0.31 0.17 -5.08*** -5.02*** 
Free_cashflow 0.14 0.00 0.16 0.00 -2.01** -1.94* 
Mgtown 0.23 0.11 0.20 0.09 2.37** 3.08*** 
C_impt 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.06 2.73*** 4.62*** 
Taxfee 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.18 1.32 
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Panel B: Distribution of auditor change by year 
Year Dismissal Resignation Total 
2000 58 15 73 
2001 355 50 405 
2002 317 67 384 
2003 385 137 522 
2004 448 199 647 
2005 421 174 595 
2006 362 129 491 
2007 319 118 437 
2008 262 56 318 
2009 258 83 341 
2010 200 100 300 
Total 3,385 1,128 4,513 
 
Panel C: Tax aggressiveness by departing and replacement auditor in the resignation sample 
  Replacement Auditor  
  Big5 Non-Big5 Difference (t and 
z- statistic) 
 
 
Departing  
Auditor 
Big5 Group 1 
n=97 
Mean=0.47 
Median=0.44 
Group 2 
n=299 
Mean=0.58 
Median=0.61 
Group 1 vs. 2 
 
t=3.81*** 
z=3.42*** 
 
Non-Big5 
Group 3 
n=46 
Mean=0.55 
Median=0.53 
Group 4 
n=686 
Mean=0.56 
Median=0.55 
Group 3 vs. 4 
 
t=0.38 
z=1.24 
  Group 1 vs. 3 Group 2 vs. 4  
Difference (t and 
z- statistic) 
 t=1.90* 
z=1.72* 
t=2.22** 
z=1.98** 
 
Panel A provides the descriptive is based on the larger sample when tax aggressiveness is measured by 
Rank_Shelter, with 4,513 firms where auditors are changed for the period 2000-2010. We exclude former 
Andersen clients to avoid a potential confounding effect on our results. We also removed firms in the 
financial industry (SIC 6000-6999). Of these auditor changes, 1,128 cases represent auditor resignation 
sample while the remaining changes are initiated by clients. This panel provides the descriptive statistics 
of the variables used in the model by auditor switch type, along with mean t-tests and median Wilcoxon 
z-tests of differences across the two groups. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1.  
Panel B provides the number of auditor resignations and dismissals by year. Panel C provides the mean 
and median Rank_Shelter for the 1,128 firms with auditor resignation. Group 1 and 4 are cases where the 
auditor switch is lateral; group 2 where the auditor switch is downward; and group 3 where the auditor 
switch is upward. The panel also provides the differences in mean and median between groups based on 
parametric t and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 3 
Pearson‟s Correlations for the variables used in the auditor resignation model. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) Resign 1.00 
                 
 
(2) Rank_Shelter 0.05 1.00 
                
 
(3) Rank_DTAX 0.07 0.34 1.00 
               
 
(4) Sale_growth -0.02 0.01 -0.01 1.00 
              
 
(5) Abs_DA 0.02 0.20 -0.04 0.07 1.00 
             
 
(6) Inv_Rec 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.00 -0.07 1.00 
            
 
(7) GCM 0.06 -0.26 -0.13 0.02 0.37 -0.07 1.00 
           
 
(8) Clean 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.00 -0.20 0.08 -0.58 1.00 
          
 
(9) Tenure 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.12 1.00 
         
 
(10) ROA 0.01 0.33 0.35 -0.02 -0.19 0.10 -0.29 0.15 0.03 1.00 
        
 
(11) Loss 0.06 -0.43 -0.26 0.03 0.21 -0.14 0.41 -0.20 -0.08 -0.39 1.00 
       
 
(12) Leverage -0.01 -0.15 -0.08 -0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.15 -0.11 0.05 -0.10 0.10 1.00 
      
 
(13) Cash -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 0.12 0.27 -0.17 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 1.00 
     
 
(14) Disagree 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
    
 
(15) Rep_Event 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.30 1.00 
   
 
(16) BigN -0.17 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.21 -0.07 -0.31 0.04 0.08 0.13 -0.25 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.03 1.00 
  
 
(17) Ln_MV -0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.26 -0.13 -0.50 0.13 0.04 0.20 -0.43 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.56 1.00 
 
 
(18) Merger -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 0.15 1.00  
(19) Mismatch 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 0.00 -0.15 0.09 -0.14 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.10 -0.03 1.00 
This panel provides the Pearson‟s correlation between variables used in the auditor resignation model for the auditor change sample. The variables 
are as defined in Table 1. The correlations are bold if significant at 1% levels (two-tailed).  
  
52 
 
Table 4 
Tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation. 
   
Panel A: Level regression 
  TAXAGG=Rank_Shelter  TAXAGG=Rank_ DTAX 
 Sign Coef Wald       Coef  
 
Wald 
 
Intercept ? -1.343 47.09 
 
-1.222 31.76*** 
TAXAGG + 0.671 22.59*** 
 
0.678 24.90*** 
Sales_growth + -0.007 1.40 
 
-0.010 1.50 
Abs_DA + 0.055 9.15*** 
 
0.007 0.08 
Inv_Rec + -0.262 2.60 
 
-0.402 4.33** 
GCM + 0.244 3.83* 
 
0.353 5.80** 
Clean - 0.069 0.54 
 
0.070 0.43 
Tenure - 0.010 2.03 
 
0.007 0.66 
ROA - 0.068 2.18 
 
0.008 0.00 
Loss + 0.309 10.39*** 
 
0.292 6.62*** 
Leverage + -0.031 0.42 
 
-0.038 0.27 
Cash - -0.062 1.68 
 
-0.155 3.52* 
Disagree + 0.445 3.93** 
 
0.649 6.29*** 
Rep_Event + 0.187 3.12* 
 
0.195 2.58 
BigN - -0.727 47.20*** 
 
-0.799 45.06*** 
Ln_MV - -0.056 6.21** 
 
-0.060 5.01** 
Merger ? -0.141 1.90 
 
-0.068 0.31 
Mismatch + 0.144 2.15 
 
0.102 0.86 
Year 
Dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
   n  4,513 
 
3,367 
Wald-
statistic 
 
245.80*** 
 
235.56*** 
Pseudo R2 
(%) 
 
9.54 
 
12.44 
 
Panel B: Change regression 
  TAXAGG=Rank_Shelter  TAXAGG=Rank_ DTAX 
 Sign Coef Wald       Coef  
 
Wald 
 
Intercept ? -2.466 648.30*** 
 
-2.316 293.40*** 
ΔTAXAGG + 0.028 3.52* 
 
0.056 10.48*** 
ΔSales_growth + 0.000 0.00 
 
0.000 0.37 
ΔAbs_DA + 0.004 4.38** 
 
0.005 1.22 
ΔInv_Rec + 0.079 0.05 
 
0.202 0.18 
ΔROA - -0.061 16.66*** 
 
0.000 0.00 
ΔLeverage + 0.020 0.91 
 
0.114 0.90 
ΔCash - -0.053 3.03* 
 
-0.033 0.11 
ΔLn_MV - -0.194 17.05*** 
 
-0.246 15.14*** 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
   n  4,137 
 
3,024 
Wald-statistic  706.40*** 
 
173.18*** 
Pseudo R2 (%)  12.52 
 
4.35 
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This table reports the logistic regression results on the relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor 
resignation. Panel A shows the results for the level regression. Panel B shows the results for the 
change regression. ΔTAXAGG as the difference in TAXAGG between year t-1 and t, which is 
then rank transformed into decile. The continuous variables are first-differenced. In both 
panels, Column 1 shows the results using Rank_Shelter to proxy tax aggressiveness; Column 2 shows 
the results using Rank_DTAX to proxy tax aggressiveness.  Coefficients on the year dummies are not 
tabulated for brevity. The detailed definition of the variables is provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
The effect of external monitoring on the relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor 
resignation. 
 
Panel A: Analyst following 
 
TAXAGG=Rank_Shelter TAXAGG=Rank_ DTAX 
 
Sign Coef. Wald  Coef. Wald 
Intercept ? -1.411 50.80*** 
 
-1.318 35.67*** 
TAXAGG + 0.791 28.39*** 
 
0.814 31.35*** 
Sales_growth + -0.007 1.42 
 
-0.010 1.47 
Abs_DA + 0.060 10.62*** 
 
0.009 0.13 
Inv_Rec + -0.263 2.61 
 
-0.417 4.62** 
GCM + 0.276 4.83** 
 
0.359 5.98** 
Clean - 0.076 0.64 
 
0.069 0.41 
Tenure - 0.009 1.67 
 
0.008 0.93 
ROA - 0.057 1.85 
 
-0.017 0.01 
Loss + 0.299 9.83*** 
 
0.281 6.13*** 
Leverage + -0.035 0.51 
 
-0.032 0.19 
Cash - -0.058 1.51 
 
-0.163 3.89* 
Disagree + 0.448 3.96* 
 
0.658 6.48*** 
Rep_Event + 0.196 3.43* 
 
0.189 2.44 
BigN - -0.727 44.56*** 
 
-0.786 41.86*** 
Ln_MV - -0.053 4.57** 
 
-0.047 2.52 
Merger ? -0.141 1.89 
 
-0.057 0.21 
Mismatch + 0.148 2.24 
 
0.095 0.74 
Analyst ? 0.057 4.86** 0.057 3.74** 
TAXAGG*Analyst - -0.120 7.27***  -0.136 6.44*** 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
   n  4,513 
 
3,367 
Wald-statistic  279.32*** 
 
268.03*** 
Pseudo R2 (%)  9.75 
 
12.77 
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Panel B: Institutional ownership 
    
 
 TAXAGG=Rank_Shelter  TAXAGG=Rank_DTAX 
 
Sign Coef. Wald  Coef. Wald 
Intercept ? -1.449 32.28*** 
 
-1.544 30.17*** 
TAXAGG + 0.835 14.36*** 
 
0.999 23.01*** 
Sales_growth + -0.020 5.46** 
 
-0.014 1.69 
Abs_DA + 0.036 1.58 
 
0.035 0.98 
Inv_Rec + -0.342 2.52 
 
-0.344 1.99 
GCM + 0.592 14.16*** 
 
0.607 10.87*** 
Clean - 0.019 0.03 
 
0.020 0.03 
Tenure - 0.006 0.54 
 
0.009 1.01 
ROA - 0.081 0.44 
 
0.015 0.00 
Loss + 0.243 4.55** 
 
0.279 4.64** 
Leverage + -0.043 0.20 
 
0.021 0.03 
Cash - -0.117 2.83* 
 
-0.124 1.82 
Disagree + 0.480 3.51* 
 
0.739 7.03*** 
Rep_Event + 0.294 6.37*** 
 
0.334 6.38*** 
BigN - -0.790 42.33 
 
-0.845 39.95*** 
Ln_MV - -0.041 1.82 
 
-0.027 0.57 
Merger ? -0.190 2.31 
 
-0.123 0.75 
Mismatch + 0.128 1.45 
 
0.108 0.84 
Institutions ? 0.854 8.66*** 0.818 4.33** 
TAXAGG*Institutions - -1.611 10.79***  -1.818 8.41*** 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
   n  3,300 
 
2,627 
Wald-statistic  247.12*** 
 
239.51*** 
Pseudo R2 (%)  11.62 
 
14.33 
 
This table reports the logistic regression results for the effect of external monitoring on the relation 
between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation. The detailed definition of the variables is 
provided in Table 1. Column 1 shows the results using Rank_Shelter to proxy tax aggressiveness; 
Column 2 shows the results using Rank_DTAX to proxy tax aggressiveness.  In Panel A, we report the 
results when outside monitoring is proxied by analyst coverage. In Panel B, we report the results 
when outside monitoring is proxied by ownership held by institutions. Coefficients on the year 
dummies are not tabulated for brevity.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
The effect of agency costs on the relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation. 
 
Panel A: Agency costs of free cash flow 
                                                       TAXAGG=Rank_Shelter             TAXAGG=Rank_DTAX 
 Sign Coef Wald  Coef Wald 
Intercept ? -1.223 36.40*** 
 
-1.141 27.28*** 
TAXAGG + 0.508 10.41*** 
 
0.534 13.78*** 
Sales_growth + -0.008 1.59 
 
-0.010 1.61 
Abs_DA + 0.049 6.90*** 
 
0.006 0.06 
Inv_Rec + -0.291 3.01* 
 
-0.416 4.46** 
GCM + 0.258 4.29** 
 
0.374 6.49*** 
Clean - 0.072 0.58 
 
0.075 0.48 
Tenure - 0.010 2.09 
 
0.007 0.84 
ROA - 0.069 2.25 
 
0.005 0.00 
Loss + 0.282 8.47*** 
 
0.280 6.02*** 
Leverage + -0.031 0.42 
 
-0.037 0.28 
Cash - -0.059 1.53 
 
-0.149 3.10* 
Disagree + 0.459 4.21** 
 
0.671 6.79*** 
Rep_Event + 0.183 3.00* 
 
0.196 2.61 
BigN - -0.734 47.98*** 
 
-0.806 45.43*** 
Ln_MV - -0.056 6.02*** 
 
-0.060 4.93** 
Merger ? -0.138 1.79 
 
-0.080 0.42 
Mismatch + 0.139 2.01 
 
0.099 0.80 
Free_Cashflow ? -0.446 6.06*** -0.599 5.62** 
TAXAGG* Free_Cashflow + 0.632 5.27**  1.073 8.22*** 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
   n  4,513 
 
3,367 
Wald-statistic  276.19*** 
 
267.28*** 
Pseudo R2 (%)  9.75 
 
12.78 
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Panel B: Managerial ownership 
                                               TAXAGG=Rank_Shelter             TAXAGG=Rank_DTAX 
 Sign Coef Wald  Coef Wald 
Intercept ? -1.327 27.67*** 
 
-1.174 18.19*** 
TAXAGG + 0.398 5.02** 
 
0.495 9.05*** 
Sales_growth + -0.014 1.35 
 
-0.035 4.41** 
Abs_DA + 0.056 5.09** 
 
0.006 0.03 
Inv_Rec + -0.387 3.62* 
 
-0.552 5.49** 
GCM + 0.424 7.17*** 
 
0.450 6.02*** 
Clean - 0.005 0.00 
 
0.012 0.01 
Tenure - 0.005 0.44 
 
0.006 0.40 
ROA - 0.064 0.83 
 
0.056 0.08 
Loss + 0.256 5.02** 
 
0.279 4.52** 
Leverage + 0.017 0.07 
 
0.021 0.04 
Cash - -0.115 3.12* 
 
-0.223 4.27** 
Disagree + 0.443 2.77* 
 
0.597 3.83** 
Rep_Event + 0.284 5.36** 
 
0.310 5.00** 
BigN - -0.842 44.01*** 
 
-0.864 37.27 
Ln_MV - -0.027 0.79 
 
-0.053 2.15 
Merger ? -0.165 1.80 
 
-0.107 0.54 
Mismatch + 0.185 2.70* 
 
0.171 1.86 
Mgtown ? 0.349 4.28** 0.250 1.57 
TAXAGG* Mgtown - -0.034 3.99**  -0.021 3.46* 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
   n  3,283 
 
2,539 
Wald-statistic  235.72*** 
 
221.91*** 
Pseudo R2 (%)  11.46 
 
13.90 
 
This table reports the logistic regression results for the effect of shareholder-manager agency costs on 
the relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation. Agency costs are proxied by 
Free_cashflow and Mgtown.  The detailed definition of the variables is provided in Table 1. Column 1 
shows the results using Rank_Shelter to proxy tax aggressiveness; Column 2 shows the results using 
Rank_DTAX to proxy tax aggressiveness.  In Panel A, we report the results when agency cost is 
proxied by Free_cashflow. In Panel B, we report the results when results when agency cost is proxied 
by Mgtown. Coefficients on the year dummies are not tabulated for brevity.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
The effect of fee importance on the relation between tax aggressiveness and auditor 
resignation. 
 
Panel A: Client total fee importance 
                                                   TAXAGG=Rank_Shelter           TAXAGG=Rank_DTAX 
 Sign Coef Wald  Coef Wald 
Intercept ? -1.517 41.92*** 
 
-1.494 35.71*** 
TAXAGG + 0.737 13.64*** 
 
1.016 31.10*** 
Sales_growth + -0.015 3.68* 
 
-0.011 1.38 
Abs_DA + 0.028 1.79 
 
0.005 0.03 
Inv_Rec + -0.292 2.49 
 
-0.420 3.99** 
GCM + 0.388 6.61*** 
 
0.336 3.95** 
Clean - 0.110 0.98 
 
-0.004 0.00 
Tenure - 0.008 1.11 
 
0.009 1.06 
ROA - 0.194 2.37 
 
0.026 0.02 
Loss + 0.246 4.79** 
 
0.249 4.10** 
Leverage + -0.090 3.15* 
 
-0.013 0.03 
Cash - -0.108 3.56* 
 
-0.146 3.05* 
Disagree + 0.418 2.65* 
 
0.647 5.08** 
Rep_Event + 0.232 3.91** 
 
0.197 2.34 
BigN - -0.883 46.68*** 
 
-0.984 47.27*** 
Ln_MV - -0.026 0.96 
 
-0.026 0.73 
Merger ? -0.120 1.02 
 
-0.157 1.30 
Mismatch + 0.055 0.24 
 
0.024 0.04 
C_impt ? 1.141 7.43*** 0.775 7.08*** 
TAXAGG* C_impt - -1.993 7.50***  -1.324 7.11*** 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
   n  3,566 
 
2,860 
Wald-statistic  239.54*** 
 
243.78*** 
Pseudo R2 (%)  11.81 
 
14.72 
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Panel B: Client tax fee importance 
                                                   TAXAGG=Rank_Shelter          TAXAGG=Rank_DTAX 
 Sign Coef Wald  Coef Wald 
Intercept ? -1.222 25.94*** 
 
-1.340 26.76*** 
TAXAGG + 0.442 4.76** 
 
0.744 18.69*** 
Sales_growth + -0.011 2.92* 
 
-0.009 1.13 
Abs_DA + 0.002 0.01 
 
0.018 0.44 
Inv_Rec + -0.155 0.68 
 
-0.264 1.41 
GCM + 0.187 1.72 
 
0.251 2.28 
Clean - 0.034 0.10 
 
0.027 0.05 
Tenure - 0.009 1.55 
 
0.004 0.22 
ROA - 0.068 0.29 
 
-0.126 0.45 
Loss + 0.159 2.07 
 
0.181 2.08 
Leverage + -0.042 0.26 
 
0.149 1.67 
Cash - -0.045 0.30 
 
-0.163 1.98 
Disagree + 0.466 3.32* 
 
0.759 6.43*** 
Rep_Event + 0.209 3.21* 
 
0.213 2.57 
BigN - -0.854 48.37*** 
 
-0.887 40.46*** 
Ln_MV - -0.045 2.57* 
 
-0.054 2.56 
Merger ? -0.088 0.59 
 
-0.098 0.52 
Mismatch + 0.135 1.52 
 
0.064 0.27 
Taxfee ? 2.989 11.04*** 1.249 1.45 
TAXAGG* Taxfee - -5.264 11.77***  -1.151 0.48 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
   n  3,595 
 
2,860 
Wald-statistic  231.81*** 
 
224.58*** 
Pseudo R2 (%)  10.63 
 
14.04 
 
This table reports the logistic regression results for the effect of fee dependence on the relation 
between tax aggressiveness and auditor resignation. In Panel A, fee dependence is proxied by client 
total fee relative to total fee at the office level. In Panel B, fee dependence is proxied by client tax fees 
relative to total fee. In Panels A and B, Column 1 shows the results using Rank_Shelter to proxy tax 
aggressiveness; Column 2 shows the results using Rank_DTAX to proxy tax aggressiveness. The 
detailed definition of the variables is provided in Table 1. Coefficients on the year dummies are not 
tabulated for brevity.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Sensitivity Tests. 
 
 
Panel A:  Alternative measures of tax aggressiveness  
 TAXAGG  
= UTB 
TAXAGG  
= PBTD 
TAXAGG  
= BTD 
TAXAGG 
 = CETR 
TAXAGG 10.878 
(2.90)* 
0.224 
(2.83)* 
0.065 
(3.89)* 
0.049 
(0.21) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
n 312 4,467 4,467 4,196 
Pseudo R-square (%) 22.82 10.01 10.07 9.37 
 
 
Panel B: F-score as an alternative proxy for financial reporting risk  
 TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
 
0.557 
(13.05)*** 
0.703 
(23.26)*** 
0.507 
(8.64)*** 
0.716 
(18.22)*** 
Fscore 
 
0.001 
(1.20) 
0.001 
(1.53) 
0.001 
(1.30) 
0.001 
(0.32) 
TAXAGG*Fscore 
 
  0.001 
(0.43) 
 
-0.000 
(0.03) 
 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
 
n 
 
 
3,938 
 
2,993 
 
3,938 
 
2,993 
Pseudo R-square (%) 9.57 12.55 9.58 12.55 
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Panel C: Total accruals as an alternative proxy for financial reporting risk 
 TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
 
0.444 
(11.80)*** 
0.670 
(24.71)*** 
0.456 
(11.77)*** 
0.672 
(22.98)*** 
HACC 
 
0.206 
(2.77)* 
0.285 
(3.38)* 
0.315 
(0.76) 
0.302 
(0.83) 
TAXAGG*HACC 
 
  -0.146 
(0.11) 
 
-0.027 
(0.00) 
 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
 
n 
 
 
4,513 
 
3,367 
 
4,513 
 
3,367 
Pseudo R-square (%) 9.28 12.43 9.28 12.43 
 
Panel D: Accrual quality as an alternative proxy for financial reporting risk 
 TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
 
0.396 
(4.43)** 
0.435 
(6.57)** 
0.356 
(3.45)* 
0.381 
(3.08)* 
AQ 
 
0.503 
(0.84) 
0.146 
(0.05) 
0.864 
(1.15) 
0.446 
(0.19) 
TAXAGG*AQ 
 
  0.947 
(0.40) 
0.646 
(0.16) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
 
n 
 
 
3,053 
 
2,491 
 
3,053 
 
2,491 
Pseudo R-square (%) 12.09 13.02 12.11 13.02 
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Panel E: Alternative control firms   
 TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 0.360 
(6.49)*** 
0.412 
(13.80)*** 
 
Controls 
 
YES 
 
YES 
n 20,385 18,043 
Pseudo R-square (%) 22.73 21.81 
 
 
Panel F: Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX period 
 Pre-SOX  Post-SOX Pooled Period 
 TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 0.909 
(1.94) 
0.192 
(0.12) 
0.652 
(20.63)*** 
0.698 
(24.76)*** 
-0.259 
(0.35) 
-0.100 
(0.05) 
TAXAGG*SOX     0.977 
(4.83)** 
0.817 
(2.91)* 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
n 478 344 4,035 3,023 4,513 3,367 
Pseudo R-square (%) 20.01 25.84 3.93 5.96 5.56 7.62 
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Panel G: Controlling for abnormal audit fees 
 TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 
 
0.420 
(5.42)*** 
0.702 
(21.30)*** 
0.830 
(9.34)*** 
0.719 
(22.31)*** 
Abn_fees 
 
0.002 
(0.02) 
0.012 
(0.51) 
0.047 
(3.10)* 
0.201 
(4.06)** 
TAXAGG* Abn_fees 
 
 
  -0.087 
(4.19)** 
 
-0.317 
(3.92)** 
 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
 
n 
 
 
3,662 
 
2,787 
 
3,662 
 
2,787 
Pseudo R-square (%) 10.22 13.86 10.37 14.03 
 
Panel H: Sub-sample of Big N clients only   
 TAXAGG 
=Rank_Shelter 
TAXAGG 
=Rank_DTAX 
TAXAGG 0.555 
(3.73)** 
0.377 
(2.73)* 
Controls YES YES 
n 1,662 1,232 
Pseudo R-square (%) 18.32 20.22 
 
The table reports the robustness of the results. Although all control variables are included in the empirical specifications, for expositional 
convenience, the table reports only the coefficient estimates and significance levels for measures of tax aggressiveness and variables of interest. 
Panel A reports four alternative measures for tax aggressiveness - unrecognized tax benefits (UTB), permanent book-tax differences (PBTD), total 
book-tax differences (BTD), and cash effective tax rate (CETR). UTB is the ending balance of the unrecognized tax benefit accrual, scaled by 
lagged total assets. PBTD refers to total book-tax differences (BTD) less temporary book-tax-differences. BTD is the total book-tax differences, 
computed as [pretax income – (current federal tax expense + current foreign tax expense)/ statutory tax rate]. CETR is the five-year sum of cash 
taxes paid dividend by five-year sum of pretax income less special item. Panels B to D report results after controlling for alternative metrics of 
financial statement risk. In Panel B, financial statement risk is proxied by the Fscore which is the predicted accounting misstatement score based 
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on Dechow et al. (2011). In Panel C, financial statement risk is proxied by the total accruals (HACC), which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
observations in the top decile of total accruals scaled by beginning assets, and 0 for other observations. In Panel D, financial statement risk is 
proxied by the accruals quality (AQ) developed by Francis et al. (2005). AQ is the absolute value of the residuals from the pooled industry-year 
cross-sectional regressions with total current accruals as the dependent variable, and cash flow in the previous, current, and subsequent years and 
changes in revenue and PPE as independent variables. Panel E uses the non-auditor change sample as the control firms. The control firms are 
matched by 4-digit SIC industry and year as the resignation firms.  Panel F reports the results for the pre- and post-SOX period separately and the 
interaction between SOX and tax aggressiveness measures. Panel G reports the results after controlling for abnormal audit fees, Abn_fees, which is 
the annual decile-rank of the residuals from the following regression model based on prior studies (e.g., Simunic 1980; Whisenant et al. 2003; 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Hanlon et al. 2012): LAUDIT =γ0 + γ1 Ln_MV + γ2 Quick + γ3 Loss + γ4 ROA+ γ5 Leverage + γ6 Inv_Rec + γ7 BM + γ8 NSEG 
+ γ9 FOPS+ γ10 Merger + γ11 Finance + γ12 Pension + γ13 SPITEM + γ14 BigN + γ15 GCM + γ16 Busy + Year Dummies, where Ln_MV is the log of 
market capitalization, Quick is the current assets minus inventories, divided by current liabilities, Loss is an indicator variable signifying if the firm 
is reporting a loss, ROA is income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets, Leverage is total debts to assets ratio, Inv_Rec is the sum of 
inventories and receivables, divided by beginning total assets, BM is book-to-market ratio, NSEG is the number of business segments, FOPS is an 
indicator variable signifying whether the firm has a foreign operation, Merger is an indicator variable signifying if the firm is engaged in a merger 
or acquisition, Finance is an indicator variable signifying if long term debt or number of shares increased by at least 10%, Pension is an indicator 
variable signifying if the pension assets or periodic pension cost is greater than $1 million, SPITEM is the magnitude of special items, BigN is an 
indicator variable signifying if the firm is audited by a Big N audit firm, and Busy is an indicator variable signifying if fiscal year end is December. 
Panel H reports the results when the sample only consists of client firms audited by Big N auditors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
